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THE VALIDITY OF GRANT-BACK AGREEMENTS
UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
PAUL G. CHEVIGNIY*
T HE "grant-back" covenant is one of the basic tools of patent licensing
by which the licensor of a patent insures his access to the developing
technology of his invention. In its most general form, the covenant re-
serves to the licensor some rights in the patents on improvements in-
vented by his licensee.' Besides successfully preserving the licensor's
access to technology, the grant-back agreement has been used as one of a
number of weapons to regiment an industry and to gain control of all the
technology.2 Despite the danger of restraint of trade in the use of this de-
vice, the courts have done little to develop the law of grant-backs since
1947, when one such agreement was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Transparent-Wrap Mack. Corp. v. Stokes & Sw;itI Co.2 The courts have
been content to reiterate that a grant-back is not unlawful except as part
of a monopolistic scheme.4 As recently as 1957, it was said, apropos of the
law of grant-backs, that, "in the shifting sands of anti-trust law, one area
has during the past ten years shown a refreshing degree of stability."'
Into this sylvan calm it appears that the Antitrust Division of the Jus-
tice Department intends to introduce a discordant note. It was recently
reported that Donald Turner, chief of the division, is interested in testing
anew the validity of grant-back agreements under the antitrust laws.0
This announcement points up the fact that the apparent stability of the
law in this area is only superficial; there is, at best, an uneasy truce be-
Al Member of the New York Bar.
1. Att'y Gen. Nat'1 Comm. Antitrust Rep. 227 (1955) gives the following definition:
"Grantback covenants, sometimes included in patent licenscs, provide for license or amsign-
ment to the licensor of any improvement patented by the licensee in the products or proceszes
of the licensed patent."
"License-backs" and "assignment-backs" have somewhat different con-equences under the
law, but they will be referred to herein collectively as grant-bacs, except when it is nccez-ary
to distinguish between them.
2. See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 US. 319, 327-23 (1947); Kobe, Inc. v.
Dempsey Pump Co., 193 F.2d 416, 422 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. S37 (1952) ; United
States v. Associated Patents, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 74, 32 (E.D. Mich. 1955), aff'd per curiam
sub nom. Mlac Inv. Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 960 (1956); United States v. General Elm.
Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, S15 (D.NJ. 1949) (lamps); United States v. General Elm. Co, E0 F.
Supp. 9S9, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (carboloy).
3. 329 US. 637 (1947).
4. Cases cited notes 33 & 34 infra.
5. Linowitz & Simmons, Antitrust Aspects of Grant Back Clauses in License Agreements,
43 Cornell L.Q. 217 (1957).
6. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1965, p. 31, col. 3.
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tween the Transparent-Wrap case and other Supreme Court cases con-
cerning patents and the antitrust laws.
The reservation of a grant-back in a patent license continues to raise
a fundamental question of the relation between patent and antitrust law:
whether the licensor has, by his license, extended the scope of his mon-
opoly beyond that lawfully conferred by his patent and has created
thereby an unreasonable restraint of trade. This question, as Mr.Turner
has indicated by his efforts to reopen inquiry into the problem, has never
been answered by the courts in a way that is convincing under other prec-
edents defining the relations between patent and antitrust law. The pres-
ent discussion will examine the legal, and some economic, considerations
affecting grant-back agreements, in an effort to determine when they may
violate the antitrust laws.
I. THE Transwrap CASE
In the case of Transparent Wrap Mack. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co.,7
known affectionately to patentees as the Transwrap case, the Supreme
Court upheld a grant-back agreement of the strongest variety, in effect an
assignment-back, under which the licensee agreed to give the licensor an
option to patent future inventions "suitable for use", in connection with
the parent invention. In light of other decisions on the relation between
patent and antitrust law, this at first seems a surprising result. The term
of any patent for an improvement will inevitably extend beyond the stat-
utory period of the parent patent, and, even during that period, the im-
provement patent may extend the control of the licensor into a wider
field than he could control solely by his own patent. Initially, it would
appear that the requirement of a grant-back extends the monopoly of the
parent patent beyond the grant of the original letters, and, therefore, that
it should be unlawful by analogy to the patent-tying cases.9
In those cases, to be sure, the monopoly was extended by requiring the
purchaser of one product to take a second product. In the case of a grant-
back agreement, of course, the licensee is not required to purchase a sec-
ond product. But, as pointed out in the recent case of Brulotte v. Thys
Co.,10 the vice of a tying arrangement is more general than the exclusion
of competition in the tied product; a tying arrangement extends the
monopoly power of the patentee beyond the confines of the monopoly
granted in the original patent." In Brulotte, the Thys Company sold
7. 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
8. Id. at 639.
9. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Turner, The
Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 50, 52-53 (1958).
10. 379 U.S. 29 (1964), The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 199 (1965).
11. 379 U.S. at 33.
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hop-picking machines, upon which it had a patent, for a flat sum to be
paid in the form of royalties based upon the amount of hops harvested
by the machine. The purchaser was barred from assigning its contract or
from moving the machines out of the county. None of these provisions
was limited to the statutory term of the patent, and the Supreme Court
held them unlawful insofar as they extended that term: 11 1[W]hatever
the legal device employed' . . . a projection of the patent monopoly
after the patent expires is not enforceable."' 2
One of the essential elements of monopoly is the power to exclude
competitors; the Brulotte case seems to say that whenever that power
to exclude is extended beyond the original patent, either by tying-in an-
other product, or stretching out the royalty payments for the patented
product, the antitrust laws may be violated.
This doctrine obviously creates serious difficulties for the legality of
grant-back clauses in patent licenses. The problem, lurking in the back-
ground of the patent-tying cases, has been brought into the open by the
Brulotte decision. The grant-back clause has a tendency to enhance the
original licensor's power to exclude, either because the patent for the im-
provement extends in time beyond the term of the original patent, or be-
cause it extends in scope beyond the original invention into a new
market. The grant-back covenant might be viewed either as a contract in
restraint of trade in violation of Section I of the Sherman Act,13 or as
monopolization by the licensor in violation of Section 2.14
An assignment-back, of course, gives a greater power to exclude than
a mere license-back, because an assignment gives the original licensor all
rights over the improvements, whereas under a license the rights must be
shared with others. But even in the case of a license-back, the original
licensor retains some power to exclude; it is only diluted, not destroyed,
by his sharing it with others. The licensor still has the power to exclude
all those who are not licensees, and, if he extends the exclusionary power
of his patent monopoly, he at least affects all those who are not licensees.
In considering the assignment-back in the Transwrap case, the Second
Circuit at first accepted the analogy to the tying cases,15 even without
benefit of the gloss subsequently supplied in the Bruotte case. In an ac-
tion by the licensee for a declaratory judgment on the contract, the dr-
cuit court, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, found the grant-back
clause unlawful per se:
The last Zwoyer [Transwrap] patent will expire in 1953, and the eleven improve-
12. Id. at 32, quoting from Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (194S).
13. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
14. 26 Stat. 209 (1Sso), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).




ment patents will expire between 1956 and 1959, so that there will be a period of
from three to six years during which, although the plaintiff will be free to make, use,
or vend the original "Transwrap Packing Machine," the defendant will be able to
compel the plaintiff to buy from it alone any inproved "Transwrap Packing Machine."
Thus the plaintiff will be required to buy from the defendant articles which, although
patented, are not covered by the Zwoyer patents. . . .The owner of all property, by
withholding it upon any other terms, may, if he can, force others to buy from him;
land is the best example and every parcel of land is a monopoly. But it is precisely
in this that a patent is not like other property; the patentee may not use it to force
others to buy of him things outide its four corners. 16
Yet the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the grant-back clause
was not illegal per se. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court
to determine whether there were facts upon the record which proved a
violation of the antitrust laws in fact, if not per se, and the Second Cir-
cuit, again by Judge Learned Hand, held that no such violation was
proven. 17
To understand how the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit could
have reached these results, we must consider the facts and the reasoning
of the decisions in some detail. The Transparent-Wrap Machine Corpo-
ration was the owner of three closely related patents covering a machine
to make, fill, and seal a connected series of small transparent envelopes.
Stokes & Smith Company was in the business of manufacturing ma-
chinery to make similar packages and to fill them with powders.
Transwrap granted Stokes & Smith an exclusive license upon the pat-
ents for the United States, Canada, and Mexico, together with a trade-
mark and know-how. In effect, Transwrap leased the business to Stokes
& Smith in return for royalties. The first Second Circuit decision sum-
marized the renewal provisions:
The contract was to last for ten years unless terminated as provided; but the plaintiff
had an option to renew it for successive periods of five years, "until the expiration of
the Patents above referred to and the expiration of any further Patents that may be
granted to or acquired by the Licensor or Licensee, covering improvements in
Transwrap Packaging Machines or inventions used, or capable of use by the Licensee
in the manufacture thereof."18
In article twelve of the license agreement, Stokes & Smith agreed to give
an option to patent any improvements on the Transwrap machine which
might be discovered by Stokes & Smith.1" It appears that the parties
16. Ibid.
17. Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Co., 161 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947).
18. 156 F.2d at 199.
19. The Supreme Court had quoted the relevant portions of the agreement: "'If the
Licensee shall discover or invent an improvement which is applicable to the Transwrap
Packaging Machine and suitable for use in connection therewith and applicable to the making
and closing of the package, but not to the filling nor to the contents of the package, It shall
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operated under this agreement for six years, until Transwrap discovered
that Stokes & Smith had obtained some fourteen (later reduced to eleven)
patents claimed to be covered by article twelve. They were to expire be-
tween three and six years after the last Transwrap patent. Transwrap
elected to terminate the license contract for this alleged breach, and
Stokes & Smith brought its declaratory judgment action to establish that
the offending article was invalid. Transwrap counterclaimed for an as-
signment of the patents pursuant to the license agreement. The facts
presented at the trial in the district court did not define the issues under
the antitrust laws with much clarity, apparently because Stokes & Smith
was determined only to establish that the grant-back clause was invalid
as a matter of law. The sole witness upon the issue of the nature and
scope of the improvements appeared for Transwrap, testifying that the
eleven patents indeed covered "improvements" within the meaning of art-
icle twelve.-" There was no proof from Stokes & Smith concerning the
scope of the eleven new patents, neither as to whether they were appli-
cable to other machines in addition to the Transwrap machine, nor as to
whether any such machines would be "important competitors" with the
Transwrap machine." The court was forced to view the new patents as
improvements within the scope of the Transwrap patent, and to determine
only the validity of the contract. Upon this proof, the district court dis-
missed the complaint and directed Stokes & Smith to assign the patents.
As discussed above, the Second Circuit reversed, relying on the tying
cases to hold, as a matter of law, that the grant-back clause was unlawful
on its face.2 '
The Supreme Court reversed this decision, recognizing that a grant-
back agreement might be used as part of a scheme to create an unlawful
monopoly where there was proof of an intent to violate or of an actual
violation of the antitrust laws.' But, since Stokes & Smith had put in no
submit the same to the Licensor, which may, at its option, apply for Letter Patent covering
the same. In the event of the failure of the Licensor so to apply for Letters Patent covering
such additional improvements, inventions or patentable idcas, the Licence may apply for
the same. In the event that such additional Letters Patent are applied for and are granted
to the Licensor, they shall be deemed covered by the terms of this License Agreement and maybe used by the Licensee hereunder v.ithout any further con-ideration, license fee or royalty
as above provided. In the event that any such additional improvements are patented by the
Licensee for use in connection with Trans.rap Packaging lachines, (after the refucal or
failure of the Licensor to apply for Patents thereon), the Licensor may, neverthelcsz, have
the use but not the exclusive use of the same outside of the several territorie3 covered by this
License Agreement. The expenses of obtaining any such Patents shall be paid by the party
applying therefor.'" 329 U.S. at 639 n.l.
20. 161 F.2d at 567.
21. Ibid.
22. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
23. 329 US. at 646.
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such proof, the Court refused to accept the analogy to the tying cases to
find the clause unlawful per se. In part, at least, this decision rested upon
the proposition that, in the tying cases cited to the court, an unpatented
product had been tied to a patented one; whereas
one who uses one patent to acquire another is not extending his patent monopoly to
articles governed by the general law and as respects which neither monopolies nor
restraints of trade are sanctioned. He is indeed using one legalized monopoly to acquire
another legalized monopoly.24
The basis for this reasoning is seriously undermined, if not destroyed, by
certain cases of coercive block-booking and package-licensing, in which
it has been held unlawful to condition the license of one legal monopoly
upon the acceptance of a license for another legal monopoly.2
In short, the Court's opinion seemed to assume that the essential evil
of a tying agreement is that it conditions the sale of a patented article
upon the sale of an unpatented one, when, in fact, the basic defect in such
an agreement is a more general one. The Court failed to answer the more
basic question implied by the tying cases: whether the power to exclude
conferred by a grant-back is so much greater than the power given in the
original patent as to render the grant-back agreement unlawful.
Although the chief argument of the Supreme Court does not entirely
support its decision, subsidiary arguments of the Supreme Court and the
court of appeals on remand are more convincing. In reply to the argument
that the improvement patents would extend beyond the period of the
original patent, the Supreme Court suggested, 0 and Judge Hand empha-
sized,27 that the market power of Transwrap would not be increased by
the grant-back. Judge Hand's decision, perhaps the most important in the
field of patent grant-backs, is worth quoting at length:
We shall ... confine ourselves to whether the contract itself shows that the defendant
was engaged in a violation of the Anti-Trust Acts. In support of this plaintiff argues
that, when the defendant fortified the monopoly of its own patents by acquiring the
plaintiff's patents, it secured a "double monopoly," which was an unlawful restraint of
trade, even though taken by itself the acquisition of those patents was lawful. The
24. Id. at 644.
25. E.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157-58 (1948); Ethyl
Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 459 (1940); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd.
v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 218 F. Supp. 1, 49 (D. Md. 1963), aff'd per curiam sub nom.
Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Bendix Corp., 327 F.2d 497 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 826 (1964). The theory of these cases is that each legal monopoly must succeed or
fail in the market on its own merits; it may not justify tying its fortunes to a more powerful
monopoly simply upon the ground that both monopolies are lawful. Similarly, it is doubtful
that a patentee can show that it is lawful for him to demand control over future patents
simply by saying that both his own and the future patents are lawful monopolies. He must
show, in addition, that he is not improperly extending his original monopoly power.
26. 329 U.S. at 646.
27. 161 F.2d at 567.
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period, to which any such restraint is necessarily limited, is that during which both
the Zwoyer patents and the plaintiff's patents will be in existence; for we must
obviously disregard any period after the expiration of the Zwoyer patents, during which
the plaintiff's patents may remain in force. In that period the defendant's control will
be precisely the samne as the plaintiff's would have been, had it not assigned. During
what we may, however, call the joint period it is true that the defendant will have a
monopoly, not only of the Zwoyer machine itself, but of any improvements upon
it covered by the plaintiff's patents: verbally, that is a "double monopoly"; actually
that phrase adds nothing to the defendant's control over production. No one will be
able to use, make or vend the Zvwoyer machine without its consent, and no one can
use, make or vend an improvement without using, making or vending the machine
improved. The defendairt's control over the industry will be no greatcr by virtue of the
improvenent patents; all it will gain during the joint pcriod is a frecdonm to add the
improvemients to the Zwoyer -machine, which it would not othcrwise have had, for its
license fromi the plaintiff terminated with the contract.
Mlorever [sic], even though the plaintiff had proved that there were machines which
some of its own patents cover, but which the defendant's patents do not, the record
would not be sufficient to raise any question of the Anti-Trust Acts. That would have
shown that during the joint period, the defendant would have extended its control
over the industry; but extension, merely as such, would not be enough. It would
remain possible that, while the Zwoyer patents were in existence, any putative
machines which they did not cover, and which the plaintiffs patents did cover, would
not be important competitors with the Zwoyer machine itself; and it is horboo: law
that not every restraint of competition is "unreasonable" and that only "unreasonable"
restraints are unlawful. All this the plaintiff should have developed at the trial, if w~e
were to pass upon it; upon the record as it comes to us, no restraint of trade appears
-to say nothing of any "unlawful" restraint.2-
It should be clear from Judge Hand's words and the facts of the Trans-
wrap case that his statement is true only if two conditions are met:
(a) there is only one licensee; and (b) the scope of the "improvements"
does not extend substantially beyond the confines of the original patent.
If there is only one licensee, as in Transwrap, the licensor will take all
the improvement patents that the licensee has, and when the original
patent expires, the licensor will have only the market power that the li-
censee would otherwise have had. The case is strengthened when (again,
this was true in Transwrap) the patentee has not himself been using the
patent and making improvements. Where there is more than one licensee,
however, the licensor will tend to amass the market power of more than
one patentee.
Similarly, if there is only one licensee, but his "improvements" are
applicable to processes or products competitive with the original process
or product, the grant-back clause will tend to expand the market power
of the original grantor. In Transwrap, however, Stokes & Smith had
proved nothing about the scope and market power of its patents, and
Judge Hand was compelled to take the word of Transwrap as to the
scope of the improvements.
28. Id. at 567. (Emphasis added.)
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In reply to the argument that the grant-back clause would discourage
invention by the licensee, the Supreme Court pointed out that Stokes &
Smith had the power to renew the license until all the patents expired,
without the payment of additional royalties.29 Stokes & Smith thus had
full access to the technology of the business, its own as well as that of
Transwrap.
These considerations suggest that the Transwrap decision was justified
only upon very narrow grounds. The courts felt that Transwrap should
be able to lease out its business without fear of being deprived of techno-
logical advances. It was permitted to take back those technological
advances, because Stokes & Smith was an exclusive licensee with
which it was not competing. The contract was treated as an exception to
the rules condemning extensions of the patent monopoly, because Trans-
wrap's market power, even when extended by the improvements, could
be no greater than its licensee's had been. Transwrap had extended its
monopoly, but the extension was not harmful. It follows that the conse-
quences for the grant-back agreement under the antitrust laws may be
different when any of the governing facts in Transwrap is not present, i.e.,
(a) when there is more than one licensee; (b) when the licensor competes
with his licensee or licensees; (c) when the scope of the improvement is
outside the scope of the parent patent; (d) when the circumstances of the
license tend to discourage invention by the licensee. We are not, of course,
privileged to conclude out of hand that the grant-back will be invalid per
se if any of these conditions exist, because we do not yet know whether,
in the absence of the special circumstances of the Transwrap case, a
grant-back is equivalent to a tie-in or any other unlawful extension of the
patent monopoly.
The law would be blessedly simple if we could conclude that all grant-
backs are unlawful which do not fall within the rather extraordinary
facts of Transwrap. It appears that we are forced to conclude, however,
that a grant-back agreement is not equivalent to either a tying agreement
or to an extension of the royalty payments beyond the term of the parent
patent. Two distinguishing marks of the grant-back agreement may be
adduced at this point:
(a) The inventor of the parent patent has an interest in preserving his
access to technological improvements in the field. By requiring his li-
censees to afford him that access, he does not create the same restraint of
trade that he would create by requiring them to take a product beyond
the scope or the term of the original patent. This legitimate interest in
29. 329 U.S. at 646. The Supreme Court did not consider the problem created by the fact
that Stokes & Smith would be locked into the market with Transwrap indefinitely if the




new developments has been recognized in the law concerning the obliga-
tions of an employee to turn inventions over to his employer. It is not an
unreasonable restraint of trade, for example, for an employee to be re-
quired to turn over to his employer all inventions made during, and even
after, employment, if the requirement is limited in time and scope of in-
vention." Although this rule is not strictly part of the antitrust laws, it
has not been destroyed by those laws. It suggests that it is not an un-
reasonable restraint for an inventor to preserve his access to improve-
ments.
(b) By forbidding the patentee to require his licensees to give him
access to technology, we may actually discourage licensing, at least
where the patentee is using the patent himself. The purpose of the legal
monopoly, as the Supreme Court has pointed out, is not to reward the in-
ventor, but to encourage the use of his inventions;1' it would be against
patent law policy to restrain his impulse in that direction. Every exten-
sion of the patent monopoly in a license, of course, encourages its wider
use, and this includes such unlawful extensions as tying agreements. To
forbid those restraints, however, does not actively discourage licensing
by threatening the patentee with a loss of knowledge of the technology,
while to forbid all grant-backs apparently would have such an effect.
A grant-back agreement and a tying agreement are not equivalent,
then, because a grant-back protects legitimate interests that a tying
agreement does not. Nevertheless, the distinction breaks down whenever
the grant-back is drawn in such a way as to extend the control of the li-
censor beyond his interest in access to technology. Such grant-back agree-
ments tend to run afoul of the doctrine in the Bruotte case condemning
extensions of the monopoly beyond the confines of the patent grant.?
While the grant-back clause in patent licenses is not unlawful per se, its
lawful use outside the facts of Transwrap appears to be restricted to the
protection of the licensor's access to the technology of his invention.
II. THE LAWFUL SCOPE OF GRANT-BACK AGREEMXENTS
Subsequent decisions in the lower courts have done little to illuminate
the limitations upon the use of grant-back clauses stated or implied in
the Transwrap decisions. The courts have been content, for the most
part, to repeat that a grant-back agreement is not per se unlawfula even
30. Guth v. Minnesota Mlining & Mlfg. Co., 72 F.2d 3S, 333-S9 (7th Cir. 1934); UniverA-
Winding Co. v. Clarke, 10S F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952); Costa, Inventing in Employment
122-23 (1953).
31. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 15S (1943).
32. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
33. Zajicek v. Koolvent Metal Awning Corp., 233 F.2d 127, 132 (9th Cir. 19C0), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 359 (1961); Cutter Labs., Inc. v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp, 179 F2d 0,
93 (9th Cir. 1949); United States v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 139 F. Supp. 244,
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in the case of several licensees, at least where improvements are avail-
able to others through non-exclusive licenses 4 In accordance with the
closing dictum of the Supreme Court in Transwrap,85 grant-back agree-
ments have sometimes been held to be objectionable as part of a monop-
olistic scheme, though not unlawful in themselves.8 Since the cases do
little more than reaffirm the holding of the Transwrap decisions, we are
obliged to penetrate the surface of the cases, and examine the effects
under the antitrust laws of each of the situations excluded by the courts
from consideration in that case. We will briefly recapitulate each of those
situations before considering them at greater length:
(a) More than one licensee. In this case the licensor may, through
his grant-back agreement, amass more market power than any one
licensee would have alone.
(b) Competing licensor. The licensor who competes with his licensees
may invent improvements which, when combined with those of the
licensee, will extend the market power beyond that of the licensor or
licensee alone.
(c) Improvement beyond the scope of the original patent. If the li-
censor obtains such an improvement through his grant-back agreement,
he automatically extends the power of his original monopoly.
(d) Tendency to discourage invention. It is clear, at least, that, if the
licensee were discouraged by any license-back agreement, a serious prob-
lem would be raised for the legality of the agreement.
It appears that these four classes will cover most of the situations out-
side the special case of an exclusive licensee covered in the Transwrap
case. If the licensee is not exclusive, he must either be in competition
with his licensor or with other licensees, and, in any of the situations,
including that of an exclusive licensee, improvements may extend beyond
the scope of the original patent. By examining each of these cases, we may
learn something of the real effects of grant-back agreements and under-
stand the scope of the Transwrap case.
261 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Modern Art Printing Co. v. Skeels, 123 F. Supp. 426, 433 (D.NJ. 1954),
rev'd on other grounds, 223 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1955). But see United States v. Besser Mfg.
Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 311 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
34. Binks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252, 259 (7th Cir. 1960),
petition for cert. dismissed per curiam, 366 U.S. 211 (1961) ; United States v. Huck Mfg. Co.,
227 F. Supp. 791, 795 (ED. Mich. 1964), aff'd per curiar by an equally divided court, 382
U.S. 197 (1965); International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 166 F. Supp. 551, 565 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 227-29 (1955); cf. United States v. E. I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 419-20 (1956) (dissenting opinion) (cellophane).
35. 329 U.S. at 646-48 (dictum).
36. Cases cited note 2 supra.
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A. The Problem of Midtiple Licensees
In answer to the objection that any improvements granted back to the
licensor in the Transwrap case would necessarily extend the period of the
monopoly past the original statutory period, the Supreme Court and the
Second Circuit32 indicated that Transwrap would have had no more of a
monopoly after the original period than Stokes & Smith would have had
if it had retained its improvements. This justification, of course, fails if
there is more than one licensee. The parent patent tends to become a
"funnel" 9 for improvements from all licensees, the aggregate of the im-
provements may be a larger monopoly than the one patentee could amass
alone, and the monopoly will certainly extend beyond the period of the
original patent.
The theory of the Transwrap case was that, if Transwrap were to drop
Stokes & Smith for its breach of contract, take all the improvements, and
begin to manufacture the packaging machine, Transwrap would be doing
exactly the same work that Stokes & Smith had done. On the other hand,
if a patentee with a large number of licensees terminates its contract with
each of them, taking all the improvements from each, and begins to man-
ufacture under all the patents, it cannot be predicted with certainty that
the manufacturer will be doing the same work that any of the licensees,
or the original licensor alone, would have done. The question is whether
this potential extension can be justified as a protection of the licensor's
legitimate interest in access to improvements. As indicated above, an
agreement for a license-back will have a less monopolistic effect than the
requirement of an assignment-back. It also seems apparent that the in-
terest of the inventor in simple access to improvements will be protected
by an agreement for a non-exclusive license-back on improvements by the
licensee.40 The interest of the original licensor in his access to technology
is surely not strong enough to permit the licensor to prevent the inventor
of the improvement from giving the same benefit to another 4 Accord-
ingly, when the original license on the parent patent is non-exclusive, it
37. See 329 U.S. at 646.
38. 161 F.2d at 567.
39. The word is so used in United States v. General Eec. Co., 32 F. Supp. 753, 316
(D.N.J. 1949) (lamps).
40. Cf. Binks Mlfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 231 F.2d 252, 259 (7th Cir.
1960), petition for cert. dismissed per curiam, 366 US. 211 (1961); United States v. Huck
Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp. 791, S04 (ElD. Mich. 1964), aft'd per curiam by an equally divided
court, 322 U.S. 197 (1965); International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 165 F. Supp. 551,
565 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
41. While the policy of the patent law is to refrain from actively discouraging the licens-
ing of patents, it does not seem that the limiting of the holder of the original patent to a
license, rather than to an assignment, would have such a discouraging effect.
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appears that a requirement for the licensee to assign outright his patents
upon improvements or to refrain from licensing third parties upon them
should be unlawful per se. Since the original licensor has an alternative
which will protect his legitimate interest, with less monopolistic effect
than the assignment-back, he should be compelled to adopt that alterna-
tive, on pain of being found to have a monopolistic purpose.4 2 Research
does not reveal that the courts have squarely taken this position, but it
is submitted here that this is the only result that is consistent with the
Brulotte case. Outside the scope of the Transwrap case, where the assign-
ment-back was not a restraint of trade because it was attendant upon an
exclusive license, the licensor must protect his interest in the access to
technology without expanding his monopoly.
This per se rule for cases where the licensor of a non-exclusive license
demands an assignment-back does not put an end to the matter, however.
It leaves open the question of whether the non-exclusive license-back
agreement may not itself be unlawful under certain circumstances. To be
sure, the requirement to give back such a non-exclusive license on im-
provements does have a restraining tendency, at least after the expira-
tion of the original patent. Except in the case where the improvements
are cumulative, the licensees may not have a great inclination to license
one another, and the owner of the original patent may be the only one
who has access to all the improvements. This effect of the parent patent
on the improvements may not be felt until the original patent has expired,
because improvements, if they really are within the scope of the original
patent, will generally not be useful except in connection with it. After the
original patent expires, however, the original patentee may be revealed
as the only competitor in the field with access to all the improvements.
Although the requirement of a non-exclusive license-back does have
a tendency towards "funneling," it is not unlawful per se in light of the
cases which approve the use of non-exclusive license-back agreements.4'1
Furthermore, such a rule would be inconsistent with the existing law con-
cerning the cross-licensing of patents. The patentees of complementary
inventions are entitled to create cross-licenses, 44 so that the public may
have the benefit of the combined invention, and there appears to be no
requirement that the period of the license must be coterminous with
the patent which first expires. Although the owner of the patent which
ends first has technically "extended" his monopoly by the bargain,
the law approves the extension, perhaps because the only practical alter-
42. Cf. Turner, supra note 9, at 60-61.
43. See cases cited note 40 supra.
44. E.g., United States v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 139 F. Supp. 244, 261




native, in the case of complementary patents, would be to deprive him
of the use of both inventions after his own had expired. Unless the cross-
license creates undue monopoly control of a market in the hands of the
patentees, then, the law approves the bargain by which each patentee
agrees to give up monopoly control of his patent, in return for access to
the other patent for its full term.
An improvement, if it really is within the scope of the original inven-
tion, seems to be a complementary invention. " It would be illogical to
deny the same privilege to the licensor before the complementary inven-
tion is created as would be available afterward. It will no doubt be
pointed out that, when the inventions come into being prior to the
license, the patentees make their cross-licenses in full knowledge of what
they bargained for, free to get such terms as they can, whereas the
licensor who enters into a grant-back agreement controls the patents
before the inventions are discovered. This appears to be a false distinc-
tion in the case of improvements, however, because they are generally
not so powerful that they can be used independently of the parent in-
vention. Even if the improvements were not invented under a license on
the parent invention, they would eventually have to be cross-licensed with
the parent invention. The licensor, furthermore, is at a distinct dis-
advantage in obtaining improvements from his licensees if he does not
have a license-back agreement. If improvements are invented by some-
one who is not a licensee, he must cross-license the improvement in
order to use the principal patent, but a licensee already has the right to
use the principal patent, and he will feel little compulsion to give back
his improvements. A licensor must have the power to get the improve-
ments from his licensees before they are invented, or he may not be able
to get them at all.
Finally, it is unlikely that a serious restraint will result from the
reservation to the licensor of a non-exclusive license in the improvements.
Most improvements, far from being funneled to the original licensor, will
probably be disseminated by cross-licenses among all the licensees who
have improvements with which to trade. The original licensor, if he did
not have the power to take a license-back, would be the only one ex-
cluded from the use of the improvements at the expiration of the
original patent. In short, there appears to be no device less restrictive
than the non-exclusive license-back which will insure the legitimate
interests of the original licensor. In cases where this non-exclusive license
creates a serious problem of monopolization in the hands of the original
patentee, the non-exclusive license may be subject to attack under the
45. See United States v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mfach. Co., 139 F. Supp. 244 (W.D.
Pa. 1956). If the improvements are extraordinarily powerful, a different problem is raked.
See text accompan3ing note 59 infra.
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antitrust laws, just as a cross-licensing arrangement may be, but it will
not be unlawful per se.4"
From our study of the cases where non-exclusive licenses are given
by the original patentee, we can reach the following conclusions concern-
ing the validity of grant-back covenants: (a) An assignment-back agree-
ment is unlawful per se; (b) A non-exclusive license-back agreement is
not unlawful, unless it has the purpose or effect of monopolization.',
These rules appear to be the only ones, consistent with the Brulotte case
and the existing antitrust law for grant-backs and cross-licenses, 48 which
will protect the interest of the inventor in continued access to the de-
veloping technol6gy of the invention.49
B. The Problem of the Competing Licensor
In the Transwrap case, the licensor took back no more of a monopoly
than the licensee would have had, partly because the licensor was not
using the parent patent and was not likely to develop any improve-
ments.50 The terms of the grant-back were justified there because Stokes
& Smith was an exclusive licensee, who had taken the use of the Trans-
wrap patents away from their inventor; but, in most cases where the
original license is not exclusive, the failure of the licensor to manufacture
under its own patent will tend to a contrary result. It will make the mo-
tives of the licensor in requiring a grant-back suspect, because he may
no longer have the reason for retaining access to the technology that a
competing licensor would have. When the licensor .competes with his
licensee, this problem is solved; but other problems are created. We shall
consider each of these cases in turn.
1. Non-competing Licensor and Multiple Licensees
We have seen that, in the case where there is more than one licensee,
the interests of the licensor will be adequately protected by a license-
back on a non-exclusive basis.6" If the licensor is not competing with his
licensees, e.g., the licensor is simply a patent-holding company which
46. The distinction drawn here between non-exclusive license-backs and assignment-backs
is made on the assumption that the license-back is not drawn so restrictively as to constitute
an assignment in disguise. In United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.NJ.
1949) (lamps), certain licensees gave back to General Electric a "non-exclusive" license, but
General Electric had the sole power to sub-license others. A license-back clause for one of a
number of licensees should leave the power to license others in the bands of the inventor.
47. The conditions under which such a monopolistic purpose or effect may arise will be
considered in more detail at pp. 589-91 infra.
48. See cases cited note 44 supra and accompanying text.
49. See cases cited note 34 supra.
50. 161 F.2d at 567.
51. See cases cited notes 33 & 34 supra and accompanying text.
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has acquired the patent, then the justifications," even for this license-back
agreement, are weakened. The patent-holder appears to have little inter-
est in retaining access to the technology. Despite this, it cannot be said
that it is unlawful per se for a non-competing licensor to demand a license-
back, for two reasons: (a) Even a patent-holder who is not using his
patent does in fact have some interest in technological developments
for purposes of sale or assignment of the patent. If he should want to sell
his patent to someone who will use it as a competitor in the market, it
would be awkward if he could not convey at least some rights in the im-
provements. The purchaser would otherwise get only the bare patent, none
of the improvements, and nothing with which to bargain for them. (b) In
most cases, the licensor will be likely to enter into competition at some
time during the term of the patent.,3 As a practical matter, it is rarely
possible to predict that the licensor will never use his patent at any time
during or after the license." If he should use it, he would, of course, need
the improvements.
In short, a rule making it per se unlawful for a non-competing licensor
to demand any sort of a grant-back would probably be undesirable. The
most that can be said is that the reservation of a grant-back clause from
multiple licensees by a non-competing licensor will be strong evidence
of an intent to control the market through grant-back agreements.
2. Competing Licensor
Where the licensor is competing with its licensees, even a single licensee,
there is a certain likelihood that the licensor will invent its own improve-
ments, thus creating a "double monopoly" after the period of the parent
patent has run. This appears to be a special case of the problem presented
by multiple licensees, and it should be answered in the same way. An
assignment-back should be unlawful per se, but a license-back should not
be invalid, except where a monopolistic intent or effect is shown.P
C. Scope of the Granzt-Back
In the Transwrap case, the plaintiff licensee, in its declaratory judg-
ment action, failed to offer any proof as to the scope of the improvements,
and, on remand, judge Hand felt constrained to find that there was no
52. See pp. 576-77 supra.
53. In the Transwrap case itself, for example, the licensor had been manufacturing the
Transwrap machine before the license was granted, and was bound to resume manufacturing
or to license another person if the license were terminated. 156 F2d at 193.
54. It does not appear that a case exactly fitting this description, without more, has been
litigated. But cf. United States v. Associated Patents, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 74 (Ef). Mich. 1955),
aff'd per curiam sub nom., Mac Inv. Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 960 (1956).
55. See pp. 5S9-91 infra.
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unreasonable restraint of trade in the grant-back clause.5 Naturally, this
argument fails if the scope of the "improvement," in fact, extends sub-
stantially beyond the scope of the original patent.
An invention may be said to be beyond or outside the scope of another
in the sense that it is useful in connection with either a competitive or a
non-competitive product or process.57 A requirement to grant-back im-
provements which includes either of these types of "extraordinary im-
provements," as they shall be termed, presents a danger of restraint of
trade. It gives the original patentee excessive power over his competitors,
or else extends the monopoly granted in the original patent into a new
field. Power over extraordinary improvements does more than simply
preserve the access of the original patentee to the technology of his inven-
tion, and, thus, such power may run afoul of the antitrust laws.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how a simple per se rule can be con-
structed which will outlaw every grant-back clause which may include
extraordinary improvements, since it cannot be foreseen what inventions
will be made. Some contract clauses are so broadly drawn that they may
include extraordinary improvements, if any are invented, but it does not
follow that all such clauses are bad per se. The requirement of an assign-
ment-back of all improvements "suitable for use"", in connection with the
Transwrap machine appears to have been such a clause; yet, the Second
Circuit held the clause valid because there was in fact no showing that
extraordinary improvements had been invented. 9 This holding is some-
what difficult to justify. The clause could have been drawn more nar-
rowly, to exclude patents and uses of patents outside the scope of the
original patent. The fact that it was not so drawn certainly raised an im-
plication that the clause was drawn for an unlawful purpose.00 However,
when faced with the fact that the clause was not shown to have extended
the power of the grantor, the courts apparently were adverse to striking
down the clause. The decision may perhaps be rationalized upon the
ground that the phrase "suitable for use" was narrowly construed so as
to include only simple improvements, at least for purposes of a declara-
tory judgment action, where the clause was not shown to have been used
for an unlawful purpose."'
56. 161 F.2d at 567.
57. Cf. Mullins Mfg. Co. v. Booth, 125 F.2d 660, 663-64 (6th Cir. 1942); Ogden v. Gen-
eral Printing Ink Corp., 37 F. Supp. 572, 577 (D. Md. 1941).
58. 329 U.S. at 639 n.1.
59. See 161 F.2d at 567-68.
60. In Brief for Respondent, pp. 4-5, Transparent-Wrap Mach. Co. v. Stokes & Smith
Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947), it was argued that the phrase "suitable for use" was too broad to
cover improvements alone.
61. Cf. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329, 332-33 (D. Conn. 1952). It
should be noted in this connection that some grant-back clauses are drawn so broadly that
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This, then, is a rather narrow holding, but it seems justified if the
broadly drawn clause would not have the effect of hampering invention
by the licensee. There are two reasons why it should not have such a
restrictive effect: (a) If the invention by the licensee is a genuine extra-
ordinary improvement, then the clause should be construed so as not to
include it, and the licensee should be able to rely upon such a construc-
tion. (b) Since simple improvements will be created in the course of the
ordinary development of the art, their invention will not be hampered by
the clause, whether the clause is narrowly drawn or not. 2
While the holding with regard to the scope of the assignment-back in
the Transwrap case may be justified, it offers little comfort to patent
licensors. The assignment-back contract is not invalid on its face, but it
should be invalid as applied to any extraordinary improvements. When
there is a grant-back clause which may be applied to extraordinary im-
provements, and it is so applied, the antitrust laws are violated. This rule,
furthermore, should be applicable to license-backs as well as assignment-
backs. If the licensee is compelled to give back even a mere license for
extraordinary improvements under the terms of the contract, the original
patentee is extending the power of his original patent, and a violation may
arise. It would appear much safer for patent licensors to exclude uses out-
side the field of the original patent from the terms of the grant-back
agreement.
It has been suggested that the validity of the grant-back agreement
ought to be determined, in part, by the scope of the monopoly granted in
the original patent. In the decision of the district court in United States
v. E. I. dzPont de Nemours & Co. (Cellopkle), the grant-back clause
in the license of the Du Pont cellophane patents was upheld, partly upon
the ground that the patents were so broad and original that the improve-
ments would not enhance the market power of Du Pont.0 This seems to
be a misleading approach. The mere fact that a patent has dominant
power does not mean that a grant-back clause is valid. If anything, such
power tends to increase the funneling effect of the original patent,0 though
the funneling may be masked by the power of the dominant patent until
after that patent has expired. The district court in the Celloplane case
may have been thinking about the effect of the grant-back only during
the term of the dominant cellophane patents, but the doctrine enunciated
they are not construed narrowly. Cf. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947);
Guth v. linnesota Mining & Mlfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934).
62. Authorities cited note 70 infra.
63. 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 US. 377 (1956).
64. 11S F. Supp. at 224-25.
65. The funneling effect of the patent was minimized in the Cellophane case bcau:2 there
was only one licensee. 351 U.S. at 3S3.
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there created some confusion and conflict in the law. A few courts had
declared grant-back clauses running to the licensors of powerful patents
to be unlawful, thinking primarily of the funneling effect of the grant-
back agreement."6 This doctrine appears to conflict with the Cellophane
case, which emphasized the market power of the original patent as a
justification for the agreement.
In the end, the hard question of whether the improvements in fact
extend beyond the scope of the original patent cannot be avoided by pre-
tending to examine the scope of the original patent alone. The existence
of a powerful and original parent patent does not rule out the possibility
of a clearly extraordinary improvement, and the power of the parent pat-
ent makes the extraordinary improvement in the hands of the licensor
of that patent all the more dangerous. This does not mean, of course, that
there are no market situations which tend to show an intent to monopo-
lize on the part of the licensor. If the licensor possesses a narrow patent,
or combination of patents, but draws a grant-back agreement which may
cover extraordinary improvements, it is very likely that the improvements
will extend beyond the scope of the original patent, ald the clause will be
used as a device for monopolization.
Finally, the strength or weakness of the original patent may be of
assistance in construing the grant-back clause. If the patent has great
market power, then a grant-back clause which describes a wide area of
technology within which improvements are to be licensed back may be
construed to cover only the field of the original patent. If the original pat-
ent is narrow, then the grant-back clause may be so broadly drawn that
it unmistakably refers to inventions outside the original patent, and the
clause will be bad on its face.
D. Discouraging Invention by the Licensee
In the Transwrap decision, the Supreme Court noted that Stokes &
Smith would not be discouraged from inventing improvements because it
could always obtain access to the new inventions by taking up its option
to renew the license from Transwrap. 8 This support for the grant-back
clause would fail if the contract did not afford the licensee-inventor access
to his invention; that is, if the contract were for a simple assignment-back
without a license reserved for the inventor.
It is questionable whether any licensor would ever be foolhardy enough
to try such a device. If any did, it would clearly be a restraint of trade
66. E.g., United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 232 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1005-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)
(carboloy).
67. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
68. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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because it would go far beyond simply protecting the access of the li-
censor to the technology of his invention. It would deprive the licensee of
the access to the technology of his invention."
It is very doubtful, however, that this, or any other grant-back clause
properly limited to ordinary improvements, would make much difference
in the rate of the invention of improvements. In the light of present-day
thinking, the chief rationale for the patent monopoly is not so much that
it encourages invention, since the flow of scientific inquiry would not be
stemmed by the denial of a monopoly, but rather that it encourages in-
vestment in, and dissemination of, scientific discoveries.1 0 It has been
pointed out that a statute to encourage investment may be needed for
genuinely "originative inventions" involving quite new products, be-
cause they require the expenditure of much time and money before they
achieve efficient production.7 1 On the other hand, "intensive inventions,"
particularly improved processes of fabricating old products, are believed
to need less encouragement for investment, since they will be produced
by competition and the natural course of inquiry in the pursuit of exist-
ing processes.'2 It would seem that improvements are, by definition, "in-
tensive inventions," and the grant-back agreement, like the patent itself,
can do very little to change the rate of their invention. In any case, the
requirement that the licensor of the parent patent afford the inventor of
the improvement some access to his invention will destroy any possible
dampening effect of the grant-back upon invention. This requirement
is chiefly rooted in the rule limiting the licensor of the parent patent to
his original monopoly plus access to improvements, rather than in the
policy of encouraging invention.
In pointing out that Stokes & Smith was free to renew its licensing
arrangement with Transwrap and, thus, to retain access to the improve-
ments, the Supreme Court passed over a most important question with-
out any discussion. That question was whether it was lawful for
Transwrap to require Stokes & Smith to remain locked in a contractual
69. The cases which permit an employer to acquire the inventions of an employee are not
contrary. See cases cited note 30 supra. An employer may acquire inventions discovercd after
the employment terminates only under an agreement strictly limited in time and scopa of
invention. These limits may be expanded somewhat when the contract permits the employee
to retain an interest in the invention. Cf. Ogden v. General Printing Ink Corp., 37 F. Supp.
572, 577 (D. Md. 1941); Dry Ice Corp. of America v. Josephson, 43 F.2d 403, 416 (E.D.N.Y.
1930).
70. See, e.g., Staff of Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyright, Senate
Comm. on the judiciary, 35th Cong., 2d Sess., An Economic Review of the Patent System
35-36 (Comm. Print 1953); Frost, The Patent System and the Modern Economy, S. Doe.
No. 22, S5th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1957).
71. See Staff of Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, Senate Comm.




relationship indefinitely, in order to obtain access to its own inventions. It
is particularly serious in the light of the Brulotte case, which declared it
unlawful for the licensor to require royalty payments beyond the period of
the original grant. Similarly, in the contract in the Transwrap case, it
appears that Stokes & Smith was obligated to pay royalties, even on the
inventions which it had assigned to Transwrap, in the event it should
elect to exercise the option to continue the contract. 73
There is a fair distinction between the Transwrap and Brulotte cases.
In the former, the royalties after the expiration of the Transwrap patents
were to be paid on lawful patent rights in improvements, while, in Bri-
lotte, the royalties were to be paid on no lawful monopoly at all. In
Transwrap, the court simply made the judgment that it was no worse
for Stokes & Smith to pay royalties to Transwrap than it was for Airans-
wrap to pay royalties to Stokes & Smith; 4 someone was going to have
to pay to use those improvement patents after the original patents had
expired. In Brulotte, without the provision in the license continuing the
royalties beyond the patent period, no one would have had to pay royal-
ties at all.
While this does distinguish the two cases, it does not really answer
the question whether it was fair for Stokes & Smith to be obliged to bear
with Transwrap indefinitely in order to obtain access to the technology
of the machine. The key to this question must lie in the fact that Trans-
wrap itself was entitled to that access, and therefore Stokes & Smith was
going to be obliged to remain with Transwrap, either as a licensee or as
a licensor of the improvements. 75 The fact that it was Stokes & Smith,
rather than Transwrap, who was paying the royalties is a distinct issue,
justified by the special circumstances of the case. One way or the other,
they were going to be obliged to work with each other as long as there
were patentable improvements which they both wanted to use.
We may then reach the following conclusions concerning the problem
of discouraging inventions by grant-back agreements: (a) It is unlikely
that the rate of invention of improvements is much influenced by grant-
back agreements. (b) Any lingering tendency to discourage the invention
of improvements by the licensee should be removed by permitting the
licensee to have access to his invention. (c) It is not unlawful for the
licensor and licensee to be bound together by the grant-back agreement,
because the parties will inevitably be linked together in some fashion
under any licensing arrangement.
73. See 156 F.2d at 199.
74. See id. at 202.
75. Cf. text accompanying note 30 supra.
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III. PROOF OF MONOPOLISTIC INTENT OR EFFECT
It would be a mistake to assume that every problem of monopolization
in connection with grant-back agreements will be resolved simply by
reference to one of the five cases we have discussed above. There are
licensing devices which will create a danger of monopolization in connec-
tion with any sort of grant-back, whether an assignment-back or a li-
cense-back, and will be equally objectionable no matter how many
licenses are involved. The Supreme Court reminded us of this in the
Transwrap case, by indicating that a grant-back agreement, while not
unlawful per se, might be used for purposes of monopolization,7 We have
further concluded above that an agreement for a non-exclusive license-
back, while not unlawful per se, may be used for purposes of monopoliza-
tion.77 Typical cases in which such a monopolistic purpose may be proven
should now be considered.
A. Objective Proof of Intent
When the licensor of the original patent admits, through documentary
evidence or other means, his intent to monopolize a market through
grant-back agreements, the antitrust laws will, of course, be violated. It
appears that proof of such intent was considered in the case of United
States v. General Elec. Co. (Lamps). s
B. Restrictive Practices
If the licensor of the parent patent agrees with his licensees to fix
prices under the improvement patent, after the expiration of the parent
patent, the contract will be clearly in restraint of trade. In the case
of United States v. Line Material Co.,79 it was held that an agreement to
interchange patents which contains such restrictions was an unlawful
contract in restraint of trade. The rule ought to be the same in the case of
grant-backs as in the case of other patent interchanges. Apart from con-
siderations of authority, it is clear that the right to fix prices or restrict
markets under the improvement patent extends beyond the original
licensor's legitimate interest in preserving his access to the technology of
his invention."0
C. Group Licenses of Patents
Patents are sometimes licensed in groups, by a single contract with a
grant-back clause. This arrangement in itself presents no difficulties be-
76. 329 U.S. at 646-47.
77. See text accompanying notes 47 & 55 supra.
78. s2 F. Supp. 753, 735-36, 810-12 (D.NJ. 1949).
79. 333 U.S. 2S7 (194S).
So. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956);




cause the group of patents often covers a single integrated product or
process. The Transwrap case itself presented this situation; there were
three patents, which together covered the Transwrap machine.81 When
the patents are weak or poorly integrated, however, the grant-back
clause in the group license may easily become the instrument for amass-
ing licenses and, thus, perpetuating a monopoly. This device, or a varia-
tion of it, perhaps appears more frequently than any other in situations
where grant-backs have been held to constitute or contribute to a re-
straint of trade.8 2 The danger signals certainly should be: (a) a group-
license for patents which are not complementary; (b) a grant-back
clause covering all the patents generally, and permitting any improve-
ments to be used in connection with all the licensed patents.
Similar problems are presented by the case of a "pool" or cross-license
among patentees, when all the cross-licensed patents are licensed together
to third parties, with a grant-back reserved to the original patentees. If
the pool is lawful, that is, if the pooled patents are complementary, so
that no patentee can get the full benefit of his invention without the oth-
ers, then it appears that the patentees should be able to obtain access to
the advances in the field by obtaining grant-backs on the integrated in-
vention from licensees of the pooled patents.8 3 Conversely, if the pooled
patents are not complementary, it is probable that the patent pool is
being used as a means to control the market. The entire arrangement,
including the grant-backs, will run afoul of the antitrust laws.84
D. Market-Dominant Patent
A much more difficult problem is presented by the case of a patent
which is so original that it creates or dominates a market. Such patents
are relatively rare, the best known example perhaps being the original
electric light patents.85 The question is whether the patentee of such a
powerful invention should have the privilege of preserving his market
power beyond the term of his patent by demanding grant-backs of im-
provements from his licensee or licensees. It appears that this problem
cannot be resolved until after the original patent has expired, because,
if the grant-back agreement is limited to simple improvements, its effect
on the market cannot be determined before that time.
In the Transwrap situation, where there is an exclusive licensee, it
should make no difference how powerful the original patent is, because
the market power of the licensor will not exceed that of his licensee. If
the licensor of the original patent remains dominant after the expiration
81. 156 F.2d at 198.
82. See cases cited note 2 supra.
83. See cases cited note 44 supra and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Associated Patents, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 74 (ED). Mich. 1955),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. Mac Inv. Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 960 (1956).
85. See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (DN.j. 1949) (lamps).
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of his original patent, it will be only because the licensee would have
been dominant if the licensor were not.80
The facts of Transwrap, however, will probably occur only rarely in
connection with a market-dominant patent. In most cases, the owner of
such a patent will be competing in the use of the patent or will grant a
number of licenses on the patent; and in such situations any arrange-
ment more restrictive than a non-exclusive license-back may be expected
to run afoul of the antitrust laws. 7 When the original patent is unusually
powerful, even the non-exclusive license-back may become unlawful. If
it appears that the funneling effect of the original patent has been very
serious, so that members of the industry other than the original licensor
do not have access to improvements, the use of license-back agreements
should be considered a device for monopolization. The licensor of the
original patent may be divested of some or all of his licenses obtained as
a result of the license-back agreements. If it appears that the improve-
ments are not generally licensed throughout the industry because of
agreements between the original licensor and his licensees which restrict
the licensing of improvements, an open licensing system for the whole
industry might be the best solution."8 As indicated above, if the original
licensor has only a non-exclusive license-back, it will be the unusual
case in which important improvements are not disseminated to all li-
censees, in the absence of collusion or coercion by the original licensor.62
Accordingly, divestiture and open licensing will be used rarely, if at all,
against patentees who have not engaged in restrictive practices. If they
should ever be so used, it seems to be in the best interests of preventing
continued monopoly control of a market.
This review of the cases in which monopolization may be found as a
matter of fact is not exhaustive; no doubt, ingenious licensors will find
others. The point is that they are condemned across the board, in connec-
tion with almost any sort of grant-back agreement, when they tend to
show a monopolistic intent. An assignment-back agreement with an ex-
clusive licensee, approved under the conditions of the Transwrap case,
may be an instrument of monopolization when documentary proof of
intent is produced, and an agreement for a non-exclusive license-back
may similarly become a device for monopolization, when it is part of an
agreement to license a group of non-complementary patents.
IXr. CONCLUSION
The courts were correct in finding that no unreasonable restraint of
trade was proven by the plaintiff-licensee in the Trans-wrap case. That
86. 161 F.2d at 567.
87. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
ss. Cf. Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 245 (1955).
sq. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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case does not, however, confer any general sanction on grant-back clauses
in patent licenses. The principal purposes of the grant-back covenant are
to protect the right of the licensor to have access to the developing tech-
nology of his invention, and to avoid discouraging licensing through the
fear of losing that access. The grant-back clause upheld in Transwrap
was too broad to be justified by these purposes alone; it had to be de-
fended upon the ground that it could not increase the licensor's monop-
oly, because it was part of an exclusive license agreement. Different
rules of law, therefore, should be applicable to grant-back clauses in
cases where the facts vary significantly from the circumstances of the
Transwrap case. These rules may be summarized as follows: (a) In
cases where the licensee is not an exclusive licensee, that is, where the
licensor is in competition or one or more other licensees are in competi-
tion in the use of the invention, the licensor should be limited to a li-
cense-back of a non-exclusive license in improvements. (b) In cases
where the licensor is not using his patent, the use of grant-backs will
create a presumption that they are being used for an unlawful purpose,
but the presumption may be rebutted. (c) The grant-back clause should
be construed narrowly, so as to include only simple improvements, and
not inventions or uses applicable to other products or processes. If such
inventions or uses have been given back or demanded under the clause,
the grant-back should be voidable under the antitrust laws. (d) It is not
unlawful for the term of the license to the original patentee on the im-
provement to extend beyond the term of the parent patent. It would be
illogical for the original patentee to be the only one excluded from the
use of the original invention, while the licensees controlled the market
through their improvements, after the expiration of the original patent.
If, however, through restrictive practices or the power of his original pat-
ents, or both, the original patentee still has control of the market after the
expiration of his patent, he may be divested of his licenses, or open li-
censing may be required.
In addition to these cases, which appear to resolve the basic problems
of policy in grant-back agreements, there are, of course, cases in which a
monopolistic intent or effect may be proven by documentary evidence,
by restrictive practices, or by the exceptional market power of the origi-
nal patent.
In summary, it is perhaps unfortunate that the problem of the grant-
back under the antitrust laws was first presented in the Transwrap case.
The protection accorded to the device in future cases should be narrower
than it was in that case. The lawful interests of the licensor can be ade-
quately covered in most cases by a non-exclusive license-back, and,
therefore, an assignment-back is only rarely justifiable.
